The price-wedge method yields a tariff-equivalent estimate of technical barriers to trade (TBT). An extension of this method accounts for imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods and incorporates recent findings on trade costs. We explore the sensitivity of this revamped TBT estimate to its key determinants (substitution elasticity, preference for home good, and trade cost). We use the augmented approach to investigate the ongoing US-Japan apple trade dispute and find that removing the Japanese TBT would yield limited export gains to the United States. We then draw policy implications of our findings.
Introduction
Article 20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits governments to set their own standards and regulations on trade in order to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, provided they do not discriminate among countries or use this motive as concealed protectionism. In addition, two specific World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements deal with food safety and animal and plant health, and with product standards: the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPSA) and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBTA). The SPSA allows countries to set their own standards, but it requires that the standards should not arbitrarily discriminate between countries with similar conditions. The TBTA was generated to minimize unnecessary obstacles in regulations, standards, and testing and certification procedures. In practice, however, some governments use stricter health and safety regulations than necessary to isolate domestic producers from international competition. The stricter regulations may lead to questionable impediments to imports that compete with domestic products, in addition to the existing tariff barriers. When the possibility of a disease or pest transmission is very low or threat to food safety is small, these trade impediments often cause welfare losses for importing countries and mercantilist losses for exporting countries due to reduced exports.
These issues have of course attracted the attention of economists (Anderson, McRae, and Wilson; Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina; Josling, Roberts, and Orden; Roberts and Krissoff) . The growing literature on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and other technical barriers to trade (TBT) often uses a price-wedge approach 1 to quantify the impact of a barrier on market equilibrium and trade (see, for example, Calvin and Krissoff; and Campbell and Gossette) . 1 The price wedge measures the difference between the internal price of a good and the reference price of a comparable good, such as a border price. It attributes the price difference to trade barriers and transportation cost. The price wedge can be expressed as a specific tax/tariff, or an ad valorem tax/tariff (Beghin and Bureau) .
Although not unique or sophisticated, the method has been legitimized in the economics literature with some prescriptions and qualifiers to account for transportation cost and quality differences (Baldwin; Deardorff and Stern) . The use of a price-wedge approach often abstracts from quality differences or simply addresses the difference by choosing "close" substitutes.
Transportation costs may be reduced to the CIF-FOB differential and abstract from the internal transportation cost once imports are landed. All price-wedge estimates we are aware of rely on the assumption of homogeneous commodities and a price arbitrage condition. By assuming that domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes, the gap between their prices reflects trade impediments from various policies and natural protection. Border tariffs and transportation and transaction costs prevent full arbitrage between the two prices (Head and Mayer) . Hence, in principle, the price gap can yield an estimate of the tariff equivalent of the TBT once transportation and trade costs and other impediments have been taken into account.
In this paper we derive a revamped tariff-equivalent estimate of a TBT. We extend the price-wedge framework by first relaxing the homogeneous commodity assumption, a straightforward but instrumental step overlooked in the literature on TBT measurement. We account explicitly for commodity heterogeneity and perceived quality of substitutes. Next, we incorporate recent developments and findings on large and costly border effects arising from transportation, linguistic differences, and poor infrastructure and law enforcement (Anderson and van Wincoop; Head and Mayer; Hummels and Skiba) . Two major findings of this new literature are particularly relevant to our work. First, trading costs are very large and often greater than policy impediments and cannot be ignored. While CIF/FOB ratios have fallen over time, other transportation and trade costs have remained high and have been underestimated. Second, these costs are structured on a per-unit basis rather than following the so-called iceberg method; 2 they act as a specific tariff rather than an ad valorem tax (Hummels and Skiba) . These per-unit costs shift supply in a parallel manner rather than proportionally, which influences the estimate of the TBT. We provide a consistent approach to apportion the internal-border price difference between potential sources of the difference (quality and heterogeneity of goods, border tariff, TBT, transportation and other transaction costs). This approach allows us to elucidate the respective role of each source leading to a credible estimate of the tariff equivalent of the TBT.
We systematically explore the robustness of the tariff-equivalent estimate to underlying assumptions on commodity heterogeneity, home-good preference, trading costs, and the chosen reference data. We show the importance of selecting best values of these key determinants (substitution elasticity, home-good preference, and trade cost) on which the policy analysis can
be centered. We then analyze the sensitivity of the TBT estimate around these central values of the determinants and associated welfare implications. The analysis shows the value of narrowing the set of possible estimates of the TBT using available data and knowledge on the quality and heterogeneity of the domestic and competing imported goods.
Our paper bridges two methods often used to estimate the trade effects of TBT: the tariffequivalent-price-wedge approach mentioned previously and the gravity-equation approach.
3
Recent conceptual developments have provided theoretical foundations to the gravity-equation approach and account explicitly for relative prices of traded and domestic substitutes and for trading costs. In addition, they attempt to better measure and decompose "border effects" of trade barriers and transportation costs between trade partners. These new approaches have been 2 The iceberg method refers to transportation cost being proportional to the value of a good. To ship a unit value of a good it takes (1+x%) unit value of that good to be shipped out. Transportation cost is equal to x% of the unit value of the good and "melts" away. 3 The gravity equation approach links trade flows between two countries to observable variables such as their relative income, and to variables inhibiting trade such as distance, linguistic barriers, and trade policy barriers (Anderson and van Wincoop). applied to aggregate trade data but not to individual commodities (Anderson and van Wincoop; Head and Mayer).
Calvin and Krissoff provide a tariff equivalent of phytosanitary barriers in the Japanese apple market regarding the risk of contamination by fire blight that has been the origin of a long WTO dispute between the US and Japan (WTO 2002 (WTO -2004 . The dispute has attracted much attention. Calvin and Krissoff use the law of one price under a homogeneous commodity assumption (arbitrage condition) to calculate the tariff equivalent of SPS barriers affecting apple imports in Japan to avoid damages from fire blight. By assuming that Japan's domestic apples and imported apples are perfect substitutes, the gap between the prices of domestic and imported apples accounts for the border tariff and other trade impediments that prevent full arbitrage. The latter authors also abstract from other border effects (internal transportation and transaction costs), leading to a likely overstatement of the cost of a TBT barrier, other things being equal.
They use several reference years to mitigate annual variations in the reference data used to calibrate the tariff equivalent to the TBT. Using recent data and the proposed revamped approach, we provide a new investigation of the Japan-US apple dispute. We compute the tariff equivalent of Japanese TBT regulations affecting apple trade and quantify the impact of removing these policies on welfare and apple trade flows. We also draw policy implications. The apple dispute offers an opportunity to validate our contention that departures from perfect substitution and significant trade costs have a substantial impact on the estimate of SPS/TBT regulation and hence on welfare and policy implications derived from this estimate.
Analytical Framework
As in the gravity equation, we use the simple constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model to incorporate the heterogeneity of goods in consumers' preferences and eventually to calculate the tariff equivalent estimate of a TBT (Hummels and Skiba) . Define domestic and imported apples, D and I. We assume the case of a small country facing a parametric exogenous world price of imports. The price P D of the domestic good is determined by the domestic good market equilibrium, as explained later in the paper. The representative consumer maximizes utility U subject to a budget constraint: 
and the corresponding expenditure function is
The associated Marshallian demand functions are 
(1)
lowers the effective price of D and increases its consumption, other things being equal. It has the opposite effects on I, increasing its effective price and decreasing its consumption. Observable price-quantity pairs and some additional information to select α and σ can be used to infer the tariff-equivalent estimate of the TBT and the interface between α and the tariff-equivalent estimate of the TBT.
The TBT first leads to a higher marginal production cost and process cost such as orchard and harvest inspections and buffer requirements (measured as 1 TBT ). This first part of the TBT leads to a higher price of apples exported to Japan because of a shift in the marginal cost for the apples going to Japan (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster) . In addition, strict inspection requirements, vendor and ordering issues, and additional requirements are added to the imported price once the apples are landed in Japan. Variable 2 TBT represents these costs in the market channel, which have been noted in the case of Japan (Gehrt et al.) . Therefore the import price I p is expressed as
where price p US represents the price/cost of US apples going elsewhere than Japan, R IT is the insurance and freight and other international trade costs of apples exported to Japan, Tariff is the specific import tariff, R T is the per-unit transportation and transaction cost from the harbor to the wholesale internal market, and TBT T is the tariff equivalent of the two components of the
From utility maximization, we know that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative price of the substitute goods, or
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution, and MU j indicates the marginal utility of good j.
From (6), the tariff equivalent of the TBT, T TBT , is solved after deriving the MRS from (1) and substituting it back into (6).
T TBT is a function of the relative cost of the two goods, their volumes, the elasticity of substitution, the preference parameter, international trade costs, internal transaction and transportation cost, and border tariff:
Equation (7) nests the conventional technique that assumes perfect substitutes leading to the TBT in order to explain the differential between the domestic price and international price adjusted for transportation. To see this, assume α = ½ and let σ → ∞. 6 Then the tariff-equivalent estimate of the TBT is ( )
If the tariff and TBT are removed, the latter expression will lead to the arbitrage condition p D = p CIF , with p CIF =p US + (IT R + T R ). In real life these two prices would differ because of quality differences and imperfect substitutability. To measure the sensitivity of T TBT to preference/quality, imperfect substitutability, and transportation cost, we compute the sensitivity elasticities of the TBT estimate with respect to σ , α , and transportation cost in the empirical section.
, with minimum subsistence parameters γ j and preference parameters α j (j = D, I) to be identified with extraneous information. 5 The ad valorem tariff equivalent is
, where t is the ad alorem tariff, it R is the ad alorem tariff equivalent of international transportation, insurance, and transaction cost, and t R is the internal transportation and transaction cost. 6 We thank a referee for suggesting this nesting. We use a small displacement model to determine the price of domestic apples and eventually infer the impact of removing the TBT barrier on imports and domestic market equilibrium. Let S be the retail supply of domestic apples, which is an increasing function of domestic apple price and exogenous parameter λ:
where ε S represents the own-price elasticity of the domestic apple supply. Decreases in parameter λ would reflect upward shifts in supply if contamination occurs and induces an increase in the cost of production. Using equations (4) and (8) 
D( p , p ) S( p ,λ ) .
Equations (4), (7), and (8), and condition (9) constitute the model. With the elimination of the TBT, I p decreases and p D will fall if there is no risk of contamination from the increased imports. The demand for domestic products declines with the change in p I . Then the domestic market adjusts at a lower price such that demand equals supply. Imports expand as the direct effect of the decrease in the import price is larger than the feedback effect of the lower domestic price, by stability. If contamination occurs, the price of domestic apples may not decrease, as the domestic supply shifts upward to reflect the increased cost from contamination. The domestic apple equilibrium quantity is further reduced by the contamination. Imports increase. For simplicity, we assume away feedback effects from apple suppliers into the income of the
representative consumer. We turn next to our investigation of the Japan-US apple dispute starting with some key stylized facts on the dispute.
The Japan-US Apple Dispute
The high technical barriers to importing apples into Japan have brought repeated complaints from several exporting countries and have led to a 30-year dispute (Elms) . The latest episode of this dispute has been taking place within the WTO. Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (WTO, 2002 (WTO, -2004 relates to the United States' complaint about the Japanese requirements imposed on apples imported from the United States and their inconsistency with WTO principles. The prohibitions and requirements included, for example, the prohibition of imported apples from states other than designated areas in Oregon and Washington; the prohibition of imported apples from any orchard (whether it is free of fire blight or not) if fire blight was detected within a 500-meter buffer zone surrounding such orchard; the requirement that export orchards be inspected three times a year (at blossom, fruitlet, and harvest stages) to check if fire blight is present in order to apply the aforementioned prohibitions; the requirement that at the post-harvest stage apples for export to Japan be separated from fruits for export to other markets; and chlorination of apples for export to Japan.
In 1997, the United States requested that Japan modify its import restrictions on apples based on published scientific evidence that mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire After that, the United States and Australia also exported apples to Japan but not continuously over time. New Zealand, EU, and Korean apples have fire blight or a related form. Australia and
Chile have been free of fire blight. Although Japan opened its door to foreign apples meeting the SPS and TBT standards regarding fire blight, the importing quantity has been quite low compared with the domestic production. As shown in Table 1 , the import shares never exceeded 0.35% between 2000 and 2002, the last period prior the constitution of the dispute panel. The low import share is partly due to the high tariff and TBT barrier increasing the cost of exporting to Japan. In addition to the high technical barrier referred to in the dispute, the higher quality of the domestic product cannot be neglected. Fruits in general and apples in particular are an important part of the Japanese diet (Huang) . Japanese consumers exhibit a strong home-good preference relative to imported apples. This fact has been repeatedly established (American University; have a higher quality because of their sweeter flavor and bigger size. For instance, after Japan opened its apple market to imports in 1995, US apples entered Japan at much lower prices than Japanese domestic products. However, after an initial success, the sales of US apples declined because Japanese consumers complained that US apples were too sour and did not cater to Japanese tastes (American University). Japanese consumers prefer apples with brix (a measure of sugar level) in a certain range and a specific brix-to-acid ratio. But imported apples do not meet these requirements. In addition, imports are smaller in size and less juicy (Kajikawa) . For
Japanese consumers who believe that apples must have an appropriate brix and acid level, firmness, juice, size, and flavor, imported apples cannot be a perfect substitute for domestic products.
Japanese farmers produce apples with great care and the production of apples is labor intensive. Leaves near each apple are usually plucked away when the fruit is still on the tree, which ensures that the apple receives enough and balanced sunlight to ensure full ripening.
Several weeks before harvesting, bags are used to protect individual apples in order to prevent any kind of surface marring. This labor-intensive production leads to a higher quality and at the same time comes at a higher cost. Because of the quality difference and trade barriers, Japanese producers are able to pass the higher costs to consumers in the form of a higher price. Hence, the trade barriers do not explain the entire price wedge. A price differential reflecting the quality premium would remain under free trade. In addition, as a fresh fruit, the internal transportation cost for apples is high and cannot be ignored.
Quantifying the Apple Dispute
We apply the framework developed in section 2 to imported apples in Japan. We use all imported apples to estimate I and the average import unit cost measured as the CIF price, shown in 
TBT Estimate and Sensitivity Analysis
The last two columns of Table 2 show the actual tariff (in yen/kg) and (specific) tariff equivalent of the TBT across different reference years when σ and α are assigned to be 7.12 and 0.64 respectively.
7. In an alternative specification, we treat imports from different countries as imperfect substitutes using a doublenested CES model and calculate the TBT estimate. Results are quite similar to what we present in this paper. For example, when we assume α =0.64, the elasticity of substitution among imports as 10, and σ =7.12, % TBT T is 65%, which is quite close to the 60% level obtained by aggregating all imports into one good. 8 We follow Calvin and Krissoff, except we choose bigger apples (see their footnotes 4 and 5). 9 Shim, Gehrt, and Lotz. (2002) provide an implicit value of α =0.55 based on a survey of Japanese housewives on their preferences of US and Japanese apples. The latter estimate is smaller than our econometric estimate but within its confidence interval. As we use total apple imports to derive our econometric estimate of α, this difference in data (all imports versus US apple imports) may contribute to the difference in the estimates of α. TBT . This fact has implications for gravity equation analyses, which often impose α =0.5. This restriction may strongly bias the estimates of impediments to trade, as the sensitivity of TBT T with respect to α is at its highest at α =0.5. 10 The ad valorem estimated values of % TBT T for the three years are 60%, 56%, and 39%, respectively. TBT is less sensitive to the domestic and imported quantities than it is to their prices (see Appendix Table A4 ). The moderate elasticities remain nearly constant as quantity levels (D and I) change. In contrast, the elasticity of T TBT with respect to the domestic price is always greater than one and gets larger as the domestic price increases (see Appendix Table A4 ). The elasticity of T TBT with respect to Tariff indicates that the sensitivity of T TBT goes up as the value of the tariff increases, although all of the estimated values are less than 0.45 (in absolute value) for Tariff, ranging from 18.7 to 46.8 yen/kg (see Appendix Table   A4 ).
Welfare Analysis of the TBT (and Tariff) Removal
The import increases induced by policy reforms are shown in Table 5 for different values of σ and α . By eliminating the TBT (alone and along with the border tariff elimination), apple imports would increase substantially, between 5.24 and 218.11 thousand metric tons (tmt), depending on home-good preference parameter α and the assumed elasticity of substitution.
These magnitudes are in a range of values comparable to those of Calvin and Krissoff. These larger imports remain moderate relative to domestic apple consumption. Japan imports apples from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. The US share of apple imports by Japan has varied widely over time. In 2000, the value share of US apples to total apple imports was 24%. Based on the 2000 share, when σ =7.12 and α =0.64, by elimination of both the TBT and the tariff, the expansion of US imports by Japan would amount to only US$4.01 million and would not exceed US$75.73 million, if one assumes σ =2.94 and α =0.54.
11 The losses to US exporters and producers would be smaller than the value of imports, first because they would be valued at lower FOB prices and farmgate prices, respectively, and because producer surplus losses are always smaller than the gross value of forgone production opportunities. The US$75.73 million figure is about half of the lost exports claimed by the United States at the WTO (US$143.4 million). Changes in welfare with elimination of the TBT and the tariff vary under different assumptions on the transmission of disease. Transmission of disease implies an upward shift of the domestic supply of apples because the variable cost of producing apples has increased. Table   6 shows the welfare implications of eliminating the TBT and the tariff for 2000, when assigning different values to α and σ , assuming transportation plus transaction costs of 78.33 yen/kg, 1 = s ε (long-run response), and under the condition of no disease transmission. Table 6 shows that the EV and the producer's surplus change dramatically with the changes to σ and α .
However, when there is no disease transmission, EV net of tariff revenue loss is greater than the loss of the producer's surplus for both elimination of the TBT and elimination of the TBT and the tariff no matter what values σ and α take. .94  1014  5444  2523  3935  7017  3334  3683  7.12 -
Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). ---denotes TBT T not being defined. The shaded area indicates the central case. Table 7 shows the welfare implications with disease transmission, holding other conditions the same as in the previous analysis. When σ =7.12 and α =0.54, the net welfare is positive. So it is optimal to eliminate either the TBT or both the TBT and tariff in this case. But when the value of α is equal to or larger than 0.64, EV plus the change in tariff revenues do not exceed the loss of producer's surplus and net welfare consequences of the reform are negative no matter what value σ takes on. So the elimination of the TBT may not improve welfare. The same logic applies to the case when both the TBT and the tariff are eliminated. Table 8 gives the short-run welfare implications of policy reforms for the case without disease transmission when supply of domestic apples is assumed to be very inelastic (
Supply expansion of perennials takes time, although at the margin apples can be moved from one use to another (from processing to fresh market) on short notice. Supply contraction is more responsive since apples can be removed from the market and stored. In any case, it is interesting to consider the implications of the less-price-responsive supply of domestic apples. As expected, the decrease in domestic price caused by the domestic demand shift is more pronounced with this 
Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). ---denotes TBT T not being defined. The shaded area indicates the central case. 
Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). ---denotes TBT T not being defined. The shaded area indicates the central case.
steeper domestic supply curve. Accordingly, EV (columns 2 and 4) increases relative to its level in the long-run case; imports and associated tariff revenues (column 1) do not expand as much; and the loss of producer surplus is more acute with this inelastic supply. Net welfare gains are mitigated by the larger losses of producer surplus.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the variation of estimates of long-run net welfare and import effects from removing the TBT as σ and α change and without disease transmission. The net welfare is EV plus change in tariff revenue net of loss of producer's surplus. The transparent horizontal plate is the zero plate, provided for reference. Figures 1 and 2 show that the net welfare and increase in imports increase as σ and α decrease. They decrease faster when σ and α are smaller (the surfaces are concave toward the origin [σ =α =0]). The net welfare eventually approaches zero when σ and α take on larger values.
Conclusions
In this paper, we revamped the tariff equivalent of a TBT by relaxing the homogeneous commodity assumption, accounting for perceived quality of substitutes and trade costs. The latter are often larger than policy impediments and cannot be abstracted from them. Transportation and trade costs are structured on a per-unit basis rather than being ad valorem. Specific (as opposed to proportional) trade costs reduce the variability of the estimate of TBT with respect to the variability of import unit value across different reference years. Their influence on the TBT estimate is mitigated as the import unit value increases. Trade costs and imperfect substitution have offsetting influences in the computation of the estimate of the TBT. Since most previous applications have ignored these two aspects, these previous applications have somewhat mitigated the error implied by the two simplifications and dissimulated the inherent sensitivity of the TBT estimate to each of these underlying parameters. Note: For visual simplicity, the net welfare measure where TBT T is not defined is set to be zero.
The rigorous investigation of the Japan-US apple dispute first validates the approach and indicates the importance of empirical estimates of the magnitude of preferences (α and σ), which we estimated econometrically. We then explored the sensitivity of the tariff equivalent estimate of the TBT with respect to these two parameters, varying their value around the central estimates we had obtained. The TBT estimate and welfare analysis based on it are sensitive to these parameters. The sensitivity to the consumers' home preference has some implications for gravity equation models that impose restrictions of equal preference/quality for imported and domestic goods. These models are likely to provide biased measures of trade impediments and should relax this assumption.
More importantly, our research raises interesting policy implications. A striking result in the analysis of the apple dispute is that the increase in apple imports would be small ( Table A2 and equation (A3) allows us to obtain σˆ and α , results reported in Table   A3 . The estimates' standard deviations are calculated using the Delta method (Greene). We also used nonlinear least squares on the second stage of the estimation; the results were n σˆ=7.15 and n α =0.67, quite close to those obtained using 2SLS. The measures ε D and ε I are equal and opposite in sign and also depend on the value of σ. The values decrease in absolute value as D and I become closer substitutes. Sensitivity measure ε P D is larger than 1 but smaller than ε α by a factor of (1-α). It decreases as goods are closer substitutes but remains larger or equal to 1. The sensitivity measures R T ε and tariff ε will be small (large) in absolute value if the transportation costs, T R , and the tariff were to be small (large) and if the estimate of the T TBT were to be large (small). Sensitivity to changes in internal transportation or transaction costs and the tariff rate will depend on their initial values and could be large for protected and poorly integrated sectors. Table A4 provides the estimated elasticities of TBT T discussed above and in the main text. 
